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The paper is intended to explore the prospective direction
of structural adjustment in eastern Germany in the light
of recent developments. The authors do argue that the
Mezzogiorno-picture, a completely de-industrialized re-
gion between the Elbe- and the Oder-river, is not con-
vincing. In the long-run, say in two decades, eastern
Germany has good opportunities to become the most
modern and competitive industrial basis in central
Europe. In the medium-run, however, a dualization is
likely - an industry with a rather new, highly capital-in-
tensive segment and a subsidized old one. Consequently,
there will emerge fast growing regions within Eastern
Germany, so-called "productivity islands", and regions
with high chronical unemployment. This will be the un-
avoidable price for a very rapid equalization of real
wages between east and west.I. Introduction: How to Merge a Socialist and a Capitalist Economy
1
The transition experiment of eastern Germany seems to support the pessimistic view - that the
"jump into the market" is not a textbook case for which solutions are easily available (Csaba
1992). Although according to recent figures it is likely that the economy has turned the corner
there is no reason to believe that the crisis is getting through. The general understanding actu-
ally recognized that the time span for the restructuring of a Soviet-type economy is much longer
than originally expected - reaching ahead for some decades rather than just for some years.
At a first glance, after three years of economic unification, the results look disappointing. East-
ern Germany still suffers from a continuing decline of major parts of its industry. In terms of
employment it has lost three quarters of the productive capacities (Graph 1) - and there is no
sign for a reversal. The Treuhandanstalt has to work hard attempting to restructure the core of
the old industries by privatization. At present, its portfolio still consists of 1 000 industrial
companies with 270 000 employees. The great majority of these companies operates at a large
loss. Without financial support they would have no chance to survive.
Graph 1 - Employment in Eastern German Manufacturing a) 1990 -1992 (Mill. Persons)
a) Enterprises with 20 and more employees
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt; own calculations.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ACE-Workshop "Industrial Restructur-
ing, Trade Re-orientation and East-West European Integration" held on 27 - 29 March 1993
in Vienna. The authors wish to thank their colleagues Klaus-Werner Schatz and Birgit
Sander for helpful comments.If the prospects are so worrying, has the German shock-therapy failed? Is eastern Germany
straight on its way to become a depressed area, a Mezzogiorno in Central Europe? Or can it
catch up with the western German economy, and if so, how quickly? Is the recent de-industri-
alization an "accident" which would have been avoidable, or is it the pre-stage to a re-industri-
alization - the necessary correction of a biased production structure as the heritage of the past?
And will other of the Central and East European countries sooner or later experience a similar
decline of production and employment?
In search of an answer it must not be overlooked that eastern Germany is a special case. The
task is not only to transform its economy from the centrally planned system into the market sys-
tem but also to integrate it into another economy, the western German one. Both economies are
rather different with respect to their level of development, factor endowment and international
competitiveness. What will happen if these two different economies merge? From the theory of
integration we would expect the following (Siebert, 1990):
(1) Both economies will try to exploit their comparative advantages. On the basis of given
factor endowment, specialization pattern and productivity differential the outcome will be
an extension and diversion of bilateral trade. In the short term scenario the superior econ-
omy will display its comparative advantages in tradables and will have a huge export
surplus. The inferior economy will have an import deficit which must be financed by
foreign capital or transfers from abroad.
(2) Both economies will experience a process of structural change - to adjust their trade and
production structures according to their long run comparative advantages. The size of re-
quired structural adjustment depends on the extent of distortions. Evidently, it is much
higher in the inferior economy than in the superior one. In the short-run scenario the in-
ferior economy will undergo a de-industrialization, but in the long-run scenario a re-in-
dustrialization is likely. In the case that the trade and production structures are identical
(albeit of different efficiency levels) an intra-industry specialization should emerge lead-
ing to more or less complementary structures in each of the two economies.
(3) Both economies will export its excess of mobile resources: the superior economy is nor-
mally relatively rich in capital and technology while in the inferior economy labour and
land exists in plenty. The transfer of mobile factors of production is an important vehicle
in the adjustment process. In the short run scenario it will avoid bottlenecks in the factor
markets, in the long-run scenario it will equate the existing differences in productivity, in
real wages and profits.Insofar there is no room at all for disappointment. The collapse of the eastern German economy
is fully congruent with standard economic theory - which predicts that in these circumstances
things must become worse before they can get better.
The crucial point is that the applied model is based on the assumption that factor prices are de-
termined by relative scarcity. In this model huge wage differences exist which are reflecting the
backwardness of the former socialist economy and, hence, the gap in productivity. In reality,
however, real wages in eastern Germany are rising rapidly, faster than productivity (Schmidt,
Sander, 1993). At present, effective wages in eastern German manufacturing have reached
66 percent, while labour productivity does not exceed 40 percent of the western German level.
From this we can conclude that unit labour costs are roughly 50 percent higher while all other
costs are nearly the same. Consequently, the prospects for many eastern German firms are gloo-
my.
II. The Heritage of the Past: What Can Be Left?
From the beginning it was clear that the eastern German economy would undergo a deep trans-
formation - like other former socialist economies do. Manufacturing was expected to shrink and
services to expand (Bode, Krieger-Boden, 1990). As industrial production and employment
have been found much higher and service production and employment much lower than it
would be derived from the "normal pattern" in western countries, it was reasonable to assume
that the shares in output and labour input would come closer to the western German level. As
Table 1 shows this projection has been confirmed by the actual development: the share of in-
dustrial production fell sharply - even much more drastically than anybody predicted. In 1992
the relative weight of manufacturing in the sectoral composition of production amounted to
only 17 percent, a loss of 21 percentage points from 1989 onward. According to the western
German pattern a relative weight of about 30 percent could have been expected.
How can this "overshooting" be explained? In order to understand the debacle it is necessary to
recall the state of the eastern German industry after the fall of the wall: the overwhelming ma-
jority of companies had been absolutely unable to compete with western companies. This has
not only been due to the main shortcomings of all Soviet-type economies such as low product
quality and low productivity. It has also been the result of the intra-bloc specialization philoso-
phy, which was practised by the COMECON countries, aimed at import substitution. Histori-
cally, there was a complementary division of labour between the eastern and western parts of
Germany: the steel or the shipbuilding industry, e.g., were mainly located in the west, the
chemical industry and the textile industry in the east. As a consequence of the autarky-strategyof the GDR the eastern German industrial structure became more and more a duplicate of the
western German one. A comparison of the employment structures^ of the GDR and the FRG
industry on a two digit level shows that both were very similar (Table 2). Significant differ-
ences were only in vehicle building (where the share in the FRG was twice as high as in the
GDR) and in manufacture of leather, textiles and clothing (where the reverse was true). Because
of this, the weight of the capital goods sector in the GDR was somewhat lower and the weight
of the consumer goods sector somewhat higher than in the FRG.
Table 1 - Comparison of Production and Employment Structures of Eastern and Western Ger-
many 1989 and 1992 (percent)
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Because of the distorted price structure in the GDR economy, it is advisable to compare the
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Source: Bode, Krieger-Boden (1990).
Meanwhile this large degree of identity in industrial structures is more of a burden than an ad-
vantage for the eastern German industry. Normally, in open western market economies with
identical factor endowment and technology, identical patterns are not exceptional. But these
economies have a high degree of intra-industry specialization; not only with respect to produc-
tion but, simultaneously, with respect to the exports and imports of manufactured goods. The
bilateral trade between the GDR and the FRG, however, had only a distant bearing to this mat-
ter. The export structure of the GDR was predominated by basic material and consumer goods
while the import structure was determined by capital goods. The export hits were textiles,
chemical products and mineral fuel which amounted to roughly 35 percent of total exports to
the FRG in 1989 (Table 3). It is evident that the GDR had no comparative advantage in these
fields: the export of textiles (most of them of low quality) was heavily subsidized, and the ex-port of chemical products and mineral fuel was only profitable on the basis of cheap crude oil
imports from the Soviet Union.
Table 3 - Sectoral Structure of Intra-German Trade in 1989 (percent)
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Source: Statistisches Bundesamt; own calculations.
The low competitiveness of the GDR industry is also reflected in the terms of trade in intra-
German trade: according to the calculations by Schmieding and Stehn in 1989 the ratio of the
GDR export prices to import prices (in DM) was on average roughly 1:3 (Table 4). It is remark-
able that the ratio was 1:4 in the consumer goods sector and even 1:5 in the capital goods sec-
tor. The price ratio was nearly the same as the productivity ratio which have been estimated to
range between 1:3 and 1:4 on average.
Table 4 - Price Ratios in Intra-German Trade in 1980 and 1989 (a)
Total Industry
of which:














of sales of the re-
spective class of goods. - (b) Without shipbuilding, air- and spacecraft, finished buildings.
Source: Jiirgen Stehn, Holger Schmieding, 1990.
It should be noted that between 1980 and 1989 the price ratios declined substantially - in fact
by almost the same amount in all market segments. Consequently, the domestic resource costs
incurred by GDR firms by selling their products on world markets rose. Akerlof et. al. (1991)
calculated that the shadow exchange rate, at which the firms would have been competitive, in
Mark per DM earned in exports to non-socialist countries was 3.73 on average in 1989; and the
rate, expressed in Transferrubel, earned in exports to non-socialist countries was 4.65. How-
ever, these rates varied extremely across sectors and within them. The costs in Mark of earning







































Source: Akerlof et. al. 1991.
The domestic resource costs are a good indicator of the viability of East German industrial
firms under free trade. The total collapse of electronic industries (the conglomerate "Mikroelek-
tronik/Robotron" needed to spend 7.17 Mark in order to earn one D-Mark) demonstrates the
predictive power of these figures.
The low competitiveness of the eastern German industry is also reflected in the composition of
its trade with all western countries. The structure, on the export as well as on the import side,
was rather comparable to those of a less developed country than of an industrialized country.
The export side was dominated by resource-intensive and labour-intensive goods and the import
side by research-intensive goods. The contrast to export and import structures of the FRG was
striking (Table 6).





































Source: Jiirgen Stehn, Holger Schmieding, 1990.In early blueprints for the time after unification the deplorable state of the eastern German in-
dustry has not been completely recognized yet. There was a widespread feeling that it would be
possible to restructure and modernize the old socialist conglomerates in a relatively short period
of time. The enormous productivity gap was the symptom and not the cause for the decline. The
cause was the general backwardness of the industrial sector in a Soviet-type economy - not only
with regard to production techniques and product quality, but also to the specialization pattern.
It has become evident that the eastern German industry must be totally built up from scratch.
This is the reason why it makes no sense to stop or to delay the decline.
HI. The Recent Trends: Between Collapse and Revival
Our anatomy shows that the eastern German industry endures an adjustment crisis. From recent
statistical figures we can conclude that it is midway between collapse and revival. While in
some branches the production has not yet reached the bottom line, in some others it has already
started up. The question arises how these different "trends" should be interpreted. Axe they an
indicator for the long-term prospects of different branches or do they simply reflect their differ-
ent short-term market conditions? A closer examination of relevant statistical figures may cast
some light on the matter.
1. Production
During the last two years the eastern German industry experienced not only a dramatic contrac-
tion but also a considerable change in its sectoral structure. At a first glance, the results look
surprising (Table 7):
On an aggregated (2-digit) level, capital goods industries have become the main losers of
the unification process. They lost about one fifth of their shares in production. Initially,
these industries have been expected to be among the winners. However, against strong
international competition they have lost nearly all their foreign and domestic markets.
Only the manufacture of constructional steel could increase its share as a result of the
building boom in eastern Germany.
Consumer goods industries have been able to stabilize their share. This is mainly due to
gains in the printing industry which benefits from a heavy demand for printing material
and from high investments by western German publishers who were entering the eastern
German markets quickly.
Basic product industries have increased their share. This can mainly be explained by fa-
vourable demand conditions and relatively high competitiveness of some branches suchas the stone, sand and clay industry. Many basic products are produced only for local
markets where they are needed to modernize the infrastructure.
Industries producing food and drinks have been the "champions" - they were able in-
crease their share from 13 percent to 18 percent. Due to the relatively high competitive-
ness of these goods already before the German unification these industries have been
among the first to be privatized. After having modernized plants most of the firms could
even extend their competitiveness.
Table 7 - Production Structure of Eastern German Manufacturing by Branches 1990 -1992 (in
percent)
Total manufacturing
Manufacture of basic products
of which:
Oil refineries
Stone, sand and clay
industries
Iron and steel industry
Foundries
Chemical industry





































































































Source: Statistisches Bundesamt; own calculations.10
From this it could be concluded that the changes in the production structure have been more
coincidental than systematical. A closer examination, however, reveals a clear-cut pattern: the
losers have been the producers of tradables where the market is characterized by high competi-
tion from western German and other non-domestic suppliers. The winners have been among
those industries producing goods for local markets - be it because these products are easily per-
ishable, because them-transport creates high costs as a result of their high weight (relative to
their value) or be it because no time is to be wasted by selling the goods like in the industries
printing newspapers. In these markets a high competition need not to be feared, because it is not
worth transporting the products.
2. Markets
At the moment the main markets for the eastern German industry are the domestic ones - espe-
cially in eastern Germany. In 1992 the share of sales to foreign markets to total sales was only
15 percent, not higher than in 1991, which is extremely low for such a small economy (Table
8). In fact, the export performance is even weaker than it appears according to these figures:
more than 60 percent of export sales are still undertaken in markets of the former COMECON
partners, massively pushed by export credits and producer subsidies. Eastern Germany has lost
almost the whole of its export basis - in contrast to the other Central and East European reform
countries which have been very successful in entering western foreign markets.
The low competitiveness especially in western markets for tradables is also reflected in the
relatively low importance of sales to western Germany. Sales of engineering products, e.g., are
nearly negligible. The only industry with a promising future which has reached a significant
share of sales to western Germany is the automobile industry mainly due to the new assembly
plants of Volkswagen and General Motors which serve eastern German markets as well as
western German ones. In the iron and steel industry and in the textile and clothing industry,
however, the prospects are gloomy. Their high share of sales on western German markets is not
an indicator for competitiveness. Many firms are only - temporarily - "prolonged workbenches"
of west German producers.11
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Source: Statistischcs Bundcsamt; own calculations.12
3. Performance
 N
The need to improve competitiveness, on international as well as on domestic markets, forces
the eastern German industry to obtain large productivity gains. In 1992 the turnover per em-
ployee (as a rough measure of labour productivity) nearly doubled (Table 9). These productivity
gains, however, have been achieved, above all, by the reduction of employment. The greatest
jump was accomplished by the automobile industry where General Motors and Volkswagen
started their new assembly plants. Also the textile industry could achieve above average pro-
ductivity gains but mainly by closing down a great number of unprofitable plants. The stone,
sand and clay industry profits from the favourable demand conditions as a result of the rising
eastern German construction activity where the increasing demand could be satisfied even with
fewer workers.
Table 9 - Turnover per Employee in Selected Branches of Eastern and Western German Manu-
facturing 1991 and 1992 (in DM)
Total Manufacturing
of which:

















































































Germany divided by turnover per employee in western
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt; own calculations.
Despite these remarkable improvements productivity in eastern Germany is still lagging behind.
In 1992 turnover per employee only reached one third of the level in Western Germany regard-
ing the industry as a whole.3 While the productivity gap in the basic goods industries was be-
low and in the capital goods industries near the average, in the consumer goods industries it
In terms of added value the gap may be somewhat higher. Normally, the eastern German
firms are less vertically integrated than western German ones, thus the ratio of added value
to employee is smaller.13
was substantially higher than the average. The textile and the clothing industry were those with
the least favourable productivity level.
It is a matter of simple arithmetic that the eastern German industry as a whole operates at heavy
losses. In 1992 the deficit amounted to 15 percent of total sales, whereas in western Germany a
surplus of 3-4 percent is normal (Graph 2). Thus, one can conclude that only a small number of
firms is profitable. Average losses of the Treuhandanstalt even accounted for roughly 30 per-
cent of total turnover in 1992. Some branches such as electrical engineering or tool engineering
reported losses of more than 50 percent of sales (Graph 3).
A company which makes losses has - in the short run - two possibilities: it can try to increase
prices or to increase productivity by cutting manpower. In eastern Germany these strategies are
now open to companies only to a limited extent:
The position of companies in price competition is still extremely weak (Table 10). Pro-
ducer prices in Eastern Germany remained almost stable in the last two years. The only
branch able to increase prices slightly was the food industry which produces mainly for
local markets where competition is lower than elsewhere.
Employment is now approaching the "bottom line". Jobs in management and mainte-
nance, e.g., are in some ways comparable to fixed overheads, some production jobs may
become obsolete, if continuous automated processes are used. Under such circumstances
manpower can be reduced only by closing down entire production units.


































Source: Statistisches Bundesamt; own calculations.14
Graph 2- Cost Structure in Eastern and Western German Manufacturing













Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung Halle.
Graph 3-Return on Sales of Treuhand-Companies in Selected Branches (1991,1992)
11992
11991
C Food, drink and tobacco
Engineering iw*•?»*•
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Ratio of Return to sales
Source: Treuhandanstalt.15
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brmer owner or to municipalities, partly
Source: Treuhandanstalt.
Many companies will be unable to meet the requirements on their own. It is therefore a matter
of greatest urgency that private investors are found for the companies currently owned by the
Treuhandanstalt. What is needed are investors able to modernize productivity plants, restructure
the product range and improve sales figures. In February 1993 only 40 percent of industrial
firms were completely privatized, 25 percent were in liquidation, 12 percent were still offered
for sale. It is not surprising that the share of Treuhand-companies in liquidation is the highest in
the leather, textile and clothing industry. It is not surprising either that in the stone, sand and
clay industry as well as in the printing industry and in those producing food, drink and tobacco
only a handful of companies are still to be privatized (Table 11).16
IV. The Prospects: Some Keystones for a Projection
What can we learn from the facts presented? We find an ongoing decline of industries produc-
ing goods saleable in international markets and a revival of industries producing goods for local
markets. That is exactly what we could expect in the short run: an economy in which incomes
are mostly based on external transfers must have a relatively large non-tradable sector. How-
ever, this cannot be a scenario for the long run. In a small open economy the expanding
branches of the future must be found mainly among industries which are able to produce com-
petitive tradables. These are exactly those which are on the decline right now.
It is hard - if not impossible - to predict precisely which branches will rise and which will de-
cline. The figures for sectoral growth and decline over the last three years do not supply suffi-
cient infonnation about the direction and the scale of adjustment necessary to overcome the
crisis. The period is too short to enable a numerical projection of the long-term trends. This is a
big challenge for forecasters. They must solve their task in the framework of a more general
evaluation of the diverse economical and political factors which may be relevant for the devel-
opment; the computer can only give limited assistance. At present only some keystones for
such a projection can be provided.
1. General Prospects
There are good reasons to argue that - despite all the existing substantial handicaps - the trans-
formation and integration of the eastern German economy will be successful. The dramatic
decline of the industrial sector has been inevitable in the short run - as a precondition for a
catch-up in the long run. It is by no means justified to argue that the eastern parts are on the
way to become Germany's Mezzogiorno.
This optimism, of course, cannot only be based on reasoning but it must be supported by facts:
The most encouraging sign is the huge - private and public - investment. Although a lot
of investment projects are still blocked by several bottlenecks (by the privatization proc-
ess and by the sluggish establishment of the administrative machinery) investments into
the productive capacities and the physical infrastructure are rising steadily. In 1993 fixed
capital investment of 131 Bill. DM is expected, in 1992 the amount was 109 Bill. DM
and in 1991 only 83 Bill. DM (Arbeitsgemeinschaft, 1993). Great parts of the capital
stock are now renewed completely, and investment projects will incorporate the most
modern technologies. The eastern German telecommunication system, e.g., will soon
have a higher standard than the western German one.17
Another positive factor is the growing transfer of knowledge, as the result of privatization
and investment from western firms. In many cases the old management was replaced
completely; the management deficits in the former socialist firms proved to be one of the
most important bottlenecks in the restructuring process.
Consequently, one can expect that a number of companies and industries in eastern Germany is
going to start strongly in the near future - when huge investments in fixed and human capital
materialize in production and employment. The completion of the two new car plants of
Volkswagen and General Motors in Saxony and Thuringia in 1993, e.g., will push production
figures in the automobile industry to some hundred thousand units annually. Recent statistical
figures suggest that the adjustment process is well under way in other branches too.
2. Sectoral Dualization
Due to the public subsidization of capital and labour there will emerge a dual economy in the
industrial sector. On the one hand the government pushes private investment by a generous aid
package (which amounts to an effective rate of subsidization of between 30 and 50 percent).
The new plants (mostly built up from scratch) will be highly capital-intensive - and probably
with a much higher degree of automation than in the west. On the other hand the government
backs employment: directly by financing several labour market measures, indirectly by pressing
the Treuhandanstalt to open its deep pockets for loss-making firms. Consequently, it delays the
decline of the old industries (steel, ship building, textiles) which face gloomy long-term pros-
pects. Basically, this dualization will be in many respects a duplicate of the development in
western regions in the 1970s and 1980s. However: while the sunset regions in the west - after
restructuring - were left with still tolerable unemployment rates of 10-15 percent, the rock bot-
tom of unemployment in the east must be expected to amount to more than 20-25 percent of the
labour force for a long time (The Kiel Institute of World Economics, 1992).
It is not possible to predict the emerging sectoral structure of the eastern German industry in de-
tail. In its modern parts it cannot just become a precise duplicate of the western German indus-
try. Huge subsidies on investment encourage to build up capital-intensive production facilities.
It is by no means a matter of course, that the German automobile industry decided to establish
two ultra-modern new plants in Saxony and Thuringia - although the normal case is to relocate
production to low-wage countries. Currently, it is hardly possible to reach definite conclusions
in this respect.18
3. Regional Agglomeration
Within eastern Germany it can be expected that the industrial heartlands of the pre-war period
in Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia and South-Brandenburg will have the best prospects for a
re-industrialization. Notwithstanding the current chronical structural problems they are attrac-
tive locations for investment. The most important advantage of these regions is perhaps that
they arc geographically well placed at the crossroads between Europe's west and east. With the
re-establishment of trade and transport links to the east, the artificial handicaps will disappear
soon. The most likely winner will be the surroundings south of the capital Berlin which is be-
coming the seat of the German government. Many firms may relocate their headquarters from
Munich, Frankfurt or Cologne where they moved after World War II. However, due to their
relatively high wages compared to neighbouring regions to the east - especially Bohemia,
Moravia and Silesia with their formidable industrial tradition - they will be no place for estab-
lishing "prolonged workbenches". The new automobile plants of Volkswagen and General Mo-
tors, e.g., are not restricted to pure assembly lines, but include manufacturing of parts and com-
ponents as well. Moreover, they will include cheap input suppliers in Central East European
countries into their facilities network. As a consequence, a new "borderline economy" will
emerge based on the division of labour between low-wage and high-wage countries.
4. Industrial Networks
Recent trends in manufacturing can be characterized by an ongoing process of internationaliza-
tion, specialization, diversification, decentralization and tertiarization (Klodt, Schmidt, 1988).
Producers are in search for new forms of organizing sourcing, production and sales. Special at-
tention is paid to new concepts such as "lean production" - aiming to lower the degree of verti-
cal integration. In order to implement the new concepts they need an efficient network of sup-
plies. Those must be located in the vicinity of the plants guaranteeing "production just in time".
With the exception of the automobile industries the new concepts have not fully materialized
anywhere.
Eastern Germany could become a place for practical experiments in a big way. Typical candi-
dates for network production are the chemical industry, the automobile industry or the iron and
steel industry. Consequently, the Treuhandanstalt's strategy is to enable such links to be estab-
lished. In the chemical industry, e.g., it tries to restructure and privatize bundles of enterprises
which are strongly interrelated. In these cases it digs deep in her pockets - in order to preserve
the agglomerational advantages of well-developed industrial networks.19
V. The Policy Conclusions: Capital or Wage Subsidies?
While in the sense of a causal therapy capital subsidies have been widely accepted as an in-
strument for a quick renewal of the eastern German capital stock, the role of wage subsidies has
remained controversial. The most striking argument against them has been that the causes for
the collapse of the old industries can surely not be cured by wage subsidies (Schatz, Schmidt,
1992). However, the front line against this instrument seems to be weakening as the political
establishment falls increasingly under pressure to stop the de-industrialization. The debate has
been triggered off by a political carelessness of the German Chancellor who promised to pre-
serve "the industrial core". But what is the "industrial core" of an industry which has lost three
quarters of its capacity? Is it the remaining torso of the ailing firms in the shipbuilding, iron and
steel or engineering industries? And, is it likely that these industries will become viable at any
time? There is a great danger that wage subsidies will prolong the crisis in certain sectors and
regions and perpetuate the structures of a dual economy. The choice of what to subsidize is not
free but has its price.
There are three major deficiencies of wage subsidies as an instrument for supporting the ad-
justment process. They
discriminate against viable and competitive enterprises;
do not give adequate incentives for adjustment, thus they introduce allocative distortions,
causing inefficient structures of production;
can easily degenerate into a self-perpetuating mechanism that leads to permanent inter-
vention in the labour market (Schmidt, Sander, 1993).
The policy for German economic unification is defined in terms of the long run economic per-
formance of the eastern part, and that is the right way. The relevant question to be asked is: how
can the profitability of investment in eastern Germany be raised at best? From a theoretical
point of view the answer is clear: capital subsidies are superior to wage subsidies. They will
massively direct capital from the west to the east - and that is the only way to catch up quickly.
An artificial reduction in labour costs, however, will hamper the renewal of the capital stock,
especially if the subsidies are intended to be granted only temporarily.20
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